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حسابان ریاضی
The most obvious aspect of this view, which has been noted by numerous commentators who do not refer to Wittgenstein as a 'formalist' [(Kielkopf 1970, 360-38), (Klenk 1976, 5, 8, 9), (Fogelin 1968, 267), (Frascolla 1994, 40), (Marion 1998, 13-14)], is that, contra Platonism, the signs and propositions of a mathematical calculus do not refer to anything.
A second important aspect of the intermediate Wittgenstein's strong formalism is his view that extra-mathematical application (and/or reference) is not a necessary condition of a mathematical calculus.
Proved mathematical propositions in a particular mathematical calculus (no need for "mathematical truth").
Refuted mathematical propositions in (or of) a particular mathematical calculus (no need for "mathematical falsity").
Concatenations of symbols that are not part of any mathematical calculus and which, for that reason, are not mathematical propositions (i.e.
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